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A Pension Plan Incorporating Both Defined Benefit
and Defined Contribution Principles
M. Zaki Khorasanee*
Abstract t
We propose a defined contribution pension plan with an explicitly defined
benefit formula. Such a plan is expected to pay more stable and predictable
benefits over time than one based on the money purchase principle. The properties of the plan are investigated through simulation. Methods for distributing
surpluses and eliminating deficiencies that involve adjusting the rate of benefit accrual (rather than varying the rate of contribution) are discussed. The
behavior of the plan under a scenario of persistently unfavorable investment
experience is Simulated, and methods for satisfactorily dealing with such a scenario are considered. The plan actuary is expected to play an important role
in maintaining an appropriate balance between solvency and stability.
Key words and phrases: money purchase plan, Simulation, equity index, investment

1 Introduction
1.1

Defined Contribution Plans

Defined contribution pension plans 1 are growing in popularity in
the United Kingdom (U.K.). In countries such as the U.S.A. and Australia
*M. Zaki Khorasanee, B.A., F.I.A., is a lecturer in the Department of Actuarial Science
and Statistics at City University, England. He obtained his B.A. degree in 1985 from
Cambridge University and has worked for six years as a pension actuary with various
consulting firms in, the London area.
Mr. Khorasanee's address is: Department of Actuarial Science and Statistics, City
University, Northampton Square, London ECl V OHB, England. Internet address:
m.z.khorasanee@city.ac.uk

tThe author would like to acknowledge the help of his colleague Professor Steven
Haberman whose comments on earlier drafts of this paper have improved both the
presentation and content of the final version.
1A pension plan (U.S.A. and Canada) is termed a pension scheme in the U.K.
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such plans are being established by employers of all sizes. The principal
advantages to the sponsoring employer of a defined contribution plan,
compared with a defined benefit plan, are:
• Stable contributions, normally a fixed percentage of the pensionable payroll;
• No risk of insolvency, thus no possibility that the plan can represent a liability for the employer;
• Freedom from compliance with legislation aimed at defined benefit plans.
The risks associated with poor investment performance are transferred to employees, who no longer can rely on their employers to pay
additional contributions in order to support a fixed benefit scale. Thus,
a report commissioned by the U.K. government (1993) recommends
that active members of defined contribution plans should appoint at
least two-thirds of the trustees. Although this proportion was reduced
to one third in subsequent legislation, the logic of allowing members
to assume responsibility for the assets of a defined contribution plan
seems inescapable, as members are the ones who will bear the adverse
consequences of any mismanagement of assets.

1.2

Money Purchase Approach

Will a rational group of employees want its defined contribution plan
to run on the money purchase principle?2 Although this is the approach
normally taken, it involves a considerable degree of investment risk for
individual members, given that:
• Equities generally are accepted as the most suitable asset class for
long-term savings because they are believed to be a hedge against
inflation and because they are expected to provide superior returns to other assets; and
• The return from equities has been, and probably will continue
to be, highly variable, so the fund accumulated by an individual
member will depend greatly on whether his or her period of membership happens to coincide with a period of favorable or unfavorable investment experience.
2In most defined contribution plans each member's accumulation of benefit is directly linked to the return on the assets of the fund over the same member's period of
service. This is sometimes called the money purchase principle.
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A comparison by Bodie (1989) based on historic U.K. investment and
earnings data for a money purchase plan in which contributions of 10
percent of earnings were invested in ordinary shares shows that the
pension of an employee with 20 years of service retiring in one of the
years from 1970 to 1987 would have varied between 13 percent and 41
percent of final salary.
1.3

Defined Benefit Approach

Most defined benefit plans provide benefits based on employee remuneration. This satisfies the salutary objective of providing the pensioner an income commensurate ·with that received while working.
The most common benefit formula grants a fixed fraction of final
salary for each year of service with the sponsoring employer. This formula directly links income received immediately before and after retirement; however, anomalies can arise if employees are subject to unusually large changes in salary close to retirement. Some pension plans
have dealt with this problem by adopting a benefit formula based on
career average salary, where each salary figure is increased on an index
of wage or price inflation over the period to retirement.
One of the most important features of these plans compared with
money purchase plans is the reduction in benefit uncertainty for individual members, especially if benefits are measured in real rather than
in nominal terms. Real salary increases are much less variable than
are real investment returns. This reduction in benefit uncertainty is
possible because of two characteristics of defined benefit plans:
• The sponsoring employer varies the rate of contribution in accordance with the financial position of the fund;
• Surpluses and deficits arising from investment volatility are tolerated, effectively smoothing volatile investment returns between
different generations of employees.
Although the first characteristic cannot, by definition, be part of a defined contribution plan, there is no reason why the second characteristic should not be. Thus, some defined contribution plans operate with
an investment reserve, in order to smooth out variability in benefits
for retiring members. The objective of this paper is to examine one
possible way of running such a plan, in which elements of the defined
benefit approach are adopted.
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1.4

Integrating Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution
Approaches

We examine the possibility of operating an integrated plan, i.e., a
defined contribution plan with a defined benefit scale. In this case
the defined benefit scale is linked to career average revalued salary.
Such a benefit scale represents the ultimate smoothing of investment
returns. Carr (1988) observes that a defined benefit scale based on
career average revalued salary is similar to a money purchase plan in
which each member's fund accumulates at the same real rate of interest.
This integrated plan deviates from the pure defined benefit approach
in one important respect: the rate of benefit accrual will vary, its value
depending on the current surplus/deficit of fund assets over accrued
liabilities. Thus, the response to a deficit is to reduce the accrual rate
for future service (rather than to increase the contribution rate as in a
pure defined benefit plan). Moderate surpluses can be tolerated as a
safety margin against future adverse experience; an excessive surplus
is handled through a fixed percentage increase in the accrued benefits
of existing members.
To my knowledge, no integrated pension plan based on the principles described above exists. As such, this paper examines the feasibility
of the proposed plan solely from an actuarial viewpoint. Only when the
merits and demerits of the plan on actuarial grounds have been considered would it be appropriate to consider legislative concerns.

2 The Model Pension Plan
2.1

Main Characteristics

Our model integrated plan has the follOwing properties:
• A single member at each age from 25 to 64 inclusive;
• The same fixed pensionable salary for each member;
• An employer contribution for each member of one unit 3 per annum, paid annually in advance;
• No employee contributions;
• No mortality before age 65;
3We use currency units adjusted for wage inflation. It follows that the fixed contribution per member is effectively a fixed proportion of salary.
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• All members who leave service before retirement are replaced by
new entrants of identical age and salary;
• All retirements occur at age 65;
• Each active member retiring at age 65 is replaced by a new entrant
age 25.
In addition, the following notation is used throughout the paper:
S(x, t)

B(x, t)

rna
a(t)

bt
B(t)
AL(t)

SF(t)
SR(t)
FR(t)
F(t)
D(t)

AVRF

2.2

Annual pensionable salary over next year of
a member age x at time t;
Accrued lump sum benefit, payable at age 65,
of a member age x at time t;
Target fraction of career average earnings per year of
pensionable service;
Additional benefit awarded to each member for each unit
of benefit accrued at time t;
Fraction of target accrual rate applied during [t, t + 1);
Benefit outgo of plan at time t;
Value of accrued liabilities at time t;
Entry age normal standard fund at time t;
Solvency ratio at time t;
Funding ratio at time t;
Market value of fund at time t;
Equity index dividend yield at time t;
Average return on fund over all t;
Actuarial return on the assets during [t, t + 1);
Return on market value of assets during [t, t + 1);
Return on equity index during [t, t + 1);
Interest rate assumed by actuary; and
1/(1 + 0.

Benefit at Retirement

We assume that a lump sum benefit, equal to some fraction of career average salary for each year of pensionable service, is paid on retirement. The lump sum retirement benefit accrues in the following
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way:
B(x + I, t + 1) = (1 + a(t)B(x, t) + mobts(x, t).

(1)

Equation (1) defines the principle on which our proposed plan is
based. It is a career average salary plan with a fixed target rate of
accrual, but the parameters a(t) and b t can be used to vary both the
benefits accrued from past senice and the future rate of accrual in a
manner appropriate to the financial position of the plan at time t. The
plan can be described as a variable defined benefit plan.
Under ideal conditions a(t) is always equal to zero and b t is always
equal to one; equation (1) then simplifies to:
B(x + I, t + 1) = B(x, t) + mos(x, t),

which represents a pure defined benefit plan in which all members receive the same fraction of career average salary for each year of pensionable service. In practice, both a(t) and b t would need to be varied
from time to time to accommodate the variable investment experience
of the plan.
In our model plan each member has the same fixed pensionable
salary, so we can write:
s(x, t) = so.
(2)
We now define:
Bo
n(x, t)

40moso

(3)

B(x, t)/(moso).

(4)

Bo is the target benefit of a member retiring with 40 years service,
and n(x, t) is the effective pensionable service of the member age x at
time t. It follows from equations (1) to (4) that:
n(x + I, t + 1)
B(x,t)

(1 + a(t)n(x,t) + b t

(5)

Bo
40 n(x, t).

(6)

Equations (5) and (6) will be used to project the liabilities of our plan.

2.3

Benefit on Withdrawal

Members who leave service before retirement would receive a deferred lump sum, payable at age 65, based on the accrued benefit at
the time employment ends. Although such individuals would not accrue benefits after leaving, it may be reasonable for them to continue
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to share in any future distributions of surplus before they retire. Thus,
equations (5) and (6), Vl1th b t set to zero, would continue to apply for
deferred pensioners.
As this withdrawal benefit is revalued in line with wage inflation
between the date of leaving and retirement, it is no different from the
benefit that would have accrued for the same period of service had the
member stayed in the plan until age 65. As we have assumed that all
those who leave early are replaced by new entrants of the same age
and salary, it follows that withdrawals before retirement have no effect
on the plan. The total benefits paid to those who leave early and their
replacements would be the same as those received by a single member
who stays in the plan until retirement.

2.4

Discontinuance Benefits

If the plan is wound up, there would be no obligation for the employer to cover any shortfall in the assets relative to the accrued liabilities, and it is unlikely that buying out liabilities linked to future wage
inflation would be an option. The logical course of action is to pay each
member an immediate transfer value, dividing the assets of the fund in
proportion to the value of each member's accrued benefits. Hence, the
amount of each transfer value would be given by:
Transfer Value

=

Solvency Ratio x B(x, t)V 65 - X

(7)

where v is the annual discount factor based on the assumed valuation
interest rate, and the solvency ratio is the market value of the assets
divided by the total value of the accrued benefits.
Although the question of solvency cover is not a problem for the
employer, it is of considerable importance to members, who run the
risk of having their benefits scaled back if the plan is wound up.

2.5

Investment Strategy

In Pension Fund Indicators '96, the U.K.-based fund manager PDFM4
quotes a figure of 77 percent of total U.K. pension fund assets being
invested in equities at the end of 1995. This figure is an average-one
would expect the equity content of any particular fund to depend of
the mean term of its liabilities and the proportion of its liabilities that
are real rather than nominal. Thus, as a general rule, the smaller the
4philips & Drew Fund Management Limited (PDFM), 10 Broadgate, Liverpool Street,
London EC2M 2RH, United Kingdom.
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number of pensioners in a pension plan, the greater the asset allocation
to equities.
Given that there are no pensioner liabilities in our proposed plan
and all the deferred pensioner liabilities are indexed in line with wages,
we assume the fund is 100 percent invested in U.K. equities. It can be
argued that part of the fund should be invested in government stocks
to reduce volatility in returns. Such a reduction in volatility could be
at the expense of lower average returns and, therefore, lower average
benefits.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine whether a defined contribution plan can reduce the variability in the benefit payout without
reducing either the average benefit payout or volatility in investment
returns.

3 Formulae for Simulations
3.1

Actuarial Valuation

There is no question that the model plan we have described would
require periodic actuarial valuations, as does any defined benefit plan.
The purpose of such valuations would be to:
• Determine the ratio of the assets of the plan to both the value
of the accrued benefits and to the standard fund of our chosen
funding method; and
• Recommend, if judged appropriate, a distribution of surplus or a
change in the rate of benefit accrual.
Two interesting questions not considered are whether the solvency of
the plan should require legal certification and whether the trustees
should have the right to refuse the actuary's advice. We assume here
that the plan is run in accordance v.ith the actuary's recommendations.

3.2

Standard FundS

Should the standard fund for our integrated plan simply be the value
of the accrued benefits? As the accrued benefits are indexed in line with
earnings, such a standard fund would be consistent with the projected
SThe term standard fund is the U.K. terminology for the target level of assets for any
particular funding method.
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unit credit method, a commonly used funding method for large defined
benefit plans.
The projected unit credit method is not prudent for our plan, however, because it requires an increasing rate of contribution for an aging membership. Because our plan is a defined contribution plan, a
projected unit credit standard fund would have insufficient assets to
meet the projected benefits of the existing members should the plan
be closed to new entrants.
The standard fund of the entry age normal method is appropriate
for our plan because:
• It would have sufficient assets to meet the projected benefits if

the plan were closed to new entrants; and
• No strain arises if new entrants above the selected entry age are
matched by withdrawing members of the same age and salary.
The second characteristic arises because a withdrawing member produces a release of reserve under the entry age normal method that
matches the strain created by a new entrant of the same age and salary.
As we have assumed that new entrants and withdrawals are matched
in this way, they can safely be ignored in our simulations. In practice
we may have a growing plan in which there are excess new entrants
entering at ages above the assumed entry age (age 25 for our plan).
This problem could be resolved by requiring such individuals to serve
a nonpensionable waiting period, during which time the employer contributions paid on their behalf would offset the strain on the fund.

3.3

Derivation of Formulae

We assume that all benefit payments from and contributions to the
plan are made at annual intervals coinciding with the date of retirement
of the oldest member. The target benefit, Bo, is set by the actuary:
Bo

=

5401 at rate i.

(8)

The benefit outgo in any year is the lump sum paid to the retiring member, hence:
Bo
B(t) = B(65, t) = 40 n(65, t).
The accrued liabilities and standard fund are given by:
64

AL(t)

=

2:

B

_

~n(x, t)v 6 :>-x
40
X=25

(9)
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SF(t)

=

L (:~[n(X,t)+65-X]V65-X-a65_XI)'

(10)

x=25

The market value of the fund is given by the recurrence formula:
F(t + 1) = (F(t) + 40)(1 + jd - B(t + 1).

3.4

(ll)

Solvency and Funding Ratios

The solvency ratio is a measure of the capacity of the pension plan's
assets to cover its accrued liabilities on an immediate wind-up of the
plan, thus:
SR(t) = F(t)/AL(t).

Clearly, large values of SR(t) are desirable.
The funding ratio, on the' other hand, concerns the extent to which
the standard fund is covered by assets. In actuarial valuations of U.K.
defined benefit plans it is customary to use a discounted cash flow
value for the assets rather than their market value, because this tends
to smooth market fluctuations. This is a highly desirable objective for
our plan, as the actuary would wish to avoid recommending benefit
changes as a result of short-term movements in the equity market.
Accordingly, we define Fa (t) to be the actuarial value of fund at
time t; and do to be the par dividend yield. As the fund is 100 percent
invested in U.K. equities, its actuarial value is:
Fa(t)

D(t)F(t) / do

(12)

FR(t)

Fa (t) / SR(t).

(13)

and

3.5

Money Purchase Plan

We compare the benefit outgo of our plan with that of a money purchase plan subject to the same investment experience. For the money
purchase plan, we define f m (x, t) to be the fund accumulated by member age x at time t and Bm (t) to be the benefit outgo at time t of the
money purchase plan. If follows that:

f m (x + 1, t + 1)
Bm(t)

(l + fm(x, t))(l + jd
fm (65, t).

(14)
(15)
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Deterministic Simulations Using Investment and
Earnings Data

In this section we simulate the progress of our plan using U.K. equity
returns and wage inflation from 1950 to 1994. Equity returns prior to
1963 are taken from the BZW Equity Index6 and thenceforth from the
FT-SE-A All-Share Index. 7 Wage inflation is based on the annual increase
in the most representative index of U.K. average earnings available at
the time, as published by the Government Statistical Service (1993).

4.1

Initial Assumptions

The target benefit offered by the plan depends on the assumption
used by the plan actuary for equity returns net of pay increases. The
average net return on the U.K. equity index, using actuarial values, is
roughly 4 percent per annum from 1950 to 1994.
We assume that:
• The actuary sets net interest at 3 percent per annum; and
• Each member initially has pensionable service n(x, 0)

=

x - 25.

Thus, from equations (8), (9), and (10) we can determine that Bo = 77.7
units, AL(O) = 1048 units, and SF(O) = 1215 units.
The equity index dividend yield at the start of 1950 was 5 percent,
which is roughly equal to the average figure from 1950 to 1994. We
therefore assume the par dividend yield to be 5 percent, in which case
the market value of the assets initially will be the same as the actuarial
value. We also assume the plan starts with a funding ratio of 100 percent, thus: F(O) = 1215 units, FR(O) = 100 percent, and SR(O) = 116
percent.
For comparison with a money purchase plan, we assume that:
• The money purchase plan starts with the same assets as our plan
and follows the same investment strategy;
• Each member's initial fund is equal to the entry age normal reserve
at 3 percent interest.
6The BZW equity index is a representath'e stock price index for ordinary shares
traded in the United Kingdom. This index is compiled by the investment bank BarcJays
de Zoete Wedd (hence BZW).
7The FT-SE-A All-Share index is the most representative U.K. stock price index since
1963. It is published by the London Financial Times and is jointly compiled by the
London Stock Exchange and the Institute of Actuaries.
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Fixed Defined Benefit Scale

We first examine what would happen to the plan if it maintained a
fixed benefit outgo regardless of its investment experience (as for a true
defined benefit plan), i.e., a(t) = 0 and b t = 1 for t ~ O. We examine
three different scenarios:
• Case A: jt

=

et and AVRF= i + 0.01;

• Case B: jt = et - 0.01 and A VRF = i; and
• Case C: jt

=

et - 0.02 and AvRF = i - 0.01.

The simulated solvency and funding ratios of the plan are shown in
Figure 1. Part (a) of Figure 1 shows the effect of the average investment
return exceeding the actuary's initial assumption by approximately 1
percent per annum over the 45 year period. The funding surplus remains within reasonable bounds until the early 1980s, at which point it
rises rapidly (from 32 percent of the standard fund in 1982 to 174 percent of the standard fund in 1995). The solvency ratio, derived from the
market value of the assets, is more volatile (falling to 49 percent after
the stock market crash of 1974-1975). The favorable investment experience of the 1980s and 1990s results in the solvency cover exceeding
400 percent in 1994.
Part (b) of Figure 1 shows how the plan behaves when the investment
experience is roughly consistent with the initial 3 percent assumption;
thus, the funding surplus after 45 years is only 22 percent of the standard fund. The solvency ratio is below 100 percent over the eight year
period from 1975 to 1983, but ends at 176 percent.
Part (c) of Figure 1 shows the effect of investment returns averaging
only 2 percent per annum, 1 percent below the actuary's assumption.
The funding and solvency ratios stay within reasonable bounds until the
early 1970s, when the plan goes heavily into deficit and never recovers.
It is only the favorable investment experience of the 1980s and 1990s
that prevents the fund from running out of assets altogether.
These simulations show that a defined contribution plan cannot indefinitely operate with a fixed defined benefit scale unless the actuary
can predict average investment returns with considerable accuracy. The
past experience has shown us a difference of 1 percent per annum between assumed and actual investment returns results in an untenable
position within 40 years. As no actuary can be confident of predicting
the average return to the required degree of accuracy, a variable benefit
scale responding to changes in the funding and solvency positions is
necessary.
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Figure 1
Fixed Defined Benefits: Solvency and Funding Ratios
Part (a): actual return
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Variable Defined Benefit Scale

Our variable defined benefit scale involves assigning values to aCt)
other than zero and values to b t other than one. Davies (1991) comments that a function of surplus in defined benefit plans is to act as
a margin against future unfayorable experience. This criterion is even
more valid for a defined contribution plan attempting to follow a defined benefit scale, as the employer has no obligation to support the
benefit scale with additional contributions. Thus, a fairly large funding surplus is desirable as a margin; perhaps only surpluses above this
funding margin should be distributed. We arbitrarily select a funding
margin of 50 percent of the standard fund, thus:
aCt)

=

FR(t)

max {1.5

-

1, O}.

(16)

A solvency ratio of less than 100 percent is a matter for serious concern, particularly as the required fund for solvency purposes would be
significantly lower than the standard fund. It seems likely that most of
the members would agree to a temporary suspension of benefit accrual
in order to restore the plan to financial health. Thus, the suggested
formula for b t is:
bt =

I if SR(t) ~ 100%
{ 0 if SR(t) < 100%.

(17)

The progress of the plan is simulated for the three investment scenarios. Figure 2 shows the values of aCt) and b t from 1950 to 1994;
Figure 3 shows the solvency and funding ratios; and Figure 4 compares
the benefit outgo of the variable defined benefit plan with that of a
money purchase plan subject to the same funding and investment experience.
As expected, the favorable investment scenario, Case A, results in
the largest and most frequent distributions of surplus (when aCt) > 0),
while benefit accrual is suspended only during the crash of 1974-1975
(when b t = 0). Under the unfavorable investment scenario, Case C,
there is no distribution of surplus (a(t) is always zero), and benefit
accrual is suspended for 13 consecutive years from 1972 to 1984.
Figure 3 shows that in all three scenarios the solvency and funding
ratios follow a remarkably similar pattern. In each case a healthy, but
reasonable, funding surplus emerges after 45 years, and the solvency
ratio ends at approximately 200 percent.
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Figure 2
Variable Defined Benefits: a(t) and b t
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Figure 3
Variable Defined Benefits: Solvency and Funding Ratios
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Figure 4
Comparison of Benefit Outflows
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Figure 4 is the most important one for judging whether the variable
defined benefit plan has any advantages over a money purchase plan.
Figure 4 shows that our proposed plan provides more stable benefits
over time. In each case the variable defined benefit outgo is a trend
line through the money purchase outgo, and sharp variations in benefit
payments from year to year are avoided.

5 Stochastic Simulations
The deterministic simulations of the previous section show us how
the variable defined benefit plan behaves when equity returns follow a
similar pattern to those experienced from 1950 to 1994. The benefit
outgo of our plan is more stable from year to year than that of a money
purchase plan.
We have yet to establish whether the projected retirement fund of
an active member of our plan is less variable than in a money purchase
plan. This question can only be answered adequately through simulations using a stochastic model for equity returns net of wage inflation.

5.1

Stochastic Model for Equity Returns

Recall that rt is the actuarial return on the assets:

rt

(1
=

+ idD(t + 1) - D(t)
D(t)

.

(18)

Let us assume that the actuarial returns form a" sequence of independent, identically-distributed, log-normal random variables. Historical
annual data from 1950 to 1994 yield the estimate for the standard de~
viation ofln[1 + rtl as 0.0675.
Next we consider how to model the equity dividend yield time series.
Wilkie (1986) observes that the average dividend yield on U.K. equities
has tended to vary about a long-term average and that yields in adjacent periods exhibit significant positive correlation. This implies that
the U.K. equity market has tended to correct itself when overvalued or
undervalued by historic standards, which has important implications
for the variability in funds accumulated over long periods.
Wilkie uses a first order autoregressive formula for the logarithm
of the equity dividend yield and assumes that past price inflation had
a direct effect on yields. Because we require a model that operates in
real values, we ignore the latter feature of Wilkie's model and use the
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following formula:
In[D(t)] = (1 - k)J.1d + kln[D(t)] + (J"dNt.Jl - k 2

(19)

where Nt is the standard normal random variable with mean zero and
unit variance, and k, J.1d, and (J"d are parametric constants. The following
estimates for the parameters are obtained from historic data from 1950
to 1994: k = 0.5, J.1d = -3.0, and (J"d = 0.24.

5.2

Initial Assumptions

One thousand independent simulations are performed for both the
variable defined benefit plan and the money purchase plan, so that
values for the projected retirement fund of members at different initial
ages are obtained for both types of plan.
The initial assumptions are as above: Bo is based on a net interest
assumption of 3 percent; FR(O) = 100%; n(x,O) = x - 25; a(t) and b t
are determined as in equations (16) and (17); and j(x, 0) = entry age
normal reserve at 3 percent net interest. For the stochastic investment
model, we assume additionally that D(O) = 5 percent and the mean of
In[1 + rtJ is In(l.03).

5.3

Dependence of Results on Initial Conditions

A problem with simulations for the variable defined benefit plan
is that the expected fund at retirement (and also, to some degree, its
variability) depends on the initial funding and solvency ratios.
We start with a funding ratio of 100 percent. Given the methods
used for determining a(t) and b t , however, the expected funding ratio
at any future time is likely to be greater than 100 percent. In the money
purchase plan there is no similar tendency to build surplus assets. It
follows that for these particular simulations the mean benefit obtained
at retirement will be lower for the variable defined benefit plan than
for the money purchase plan. This will not be true in general, however,
because for future new entrants to the variable defined benefit plan the
funding ratio is as likely to rise as to fall over their period of service.
Also, in the variable defined benefit plan it seems likely that the
variability of the benefit paid at retirement will depend on the size of
the initial fund. Perhaps this variability would be greatest if the initial
funding position of the plan were either very strong or very weak, as
either a(t) or b t then would be more likely to deviate from its usual
value.
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In spite of the problems outlined above, we should still obtain some
useful information from these simulations, particularly in relation to
how the variability in the projected retirement benefit reduces as the
member gets closer to retirement, which we term the narrowing funnel
of doubt.

5.4

Results of Stochastic Simulations

Percentiles for the projected retirement benefit are obtained for both
the variable defined benefit and money purchase plans for members initiallyage 25, 45, and 55 and are displayed in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.
For each initial age the money purchase plan pays a higher median benefit. This occurs because we chose an initial funding ratio of 100 percent
for the variable defined benefit plan. There is no reason to believe that
in the long term the median benefit paid by the two types of plan would
differ significantly. To compare the variability of the projected benefit
in each type of plan, we tabulate the ratio of the benefit at the 75th
percentile to that at the 25th percentile; see Table 3.
Table 1
Percentiles for Variable Defined Benefit Plan
Initial
Percentile
Age
5th 25th 50th 75th
95th
142.2
25
46.6 60.2 71.8 92.0
58.3 66.0 71.8 77.7
102.2
45
66.0 69.9 73.8 75.7
78.0
55

Percentiles
Initial
5th
Age
43.8
25
45
47.0
47.8
55

Table 2
for Money Purchase Plan
Percentile
25th 50th 75th
95th
62.3 79.8 104.7 151.7
63.7 80.6 101.5 141.7
63.4 76.7
95.6 129.9
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Initial
Age
25
45
55

Table 3
Interquartile Ratio
Money
Variable
Defined Benefit Purchase
1.53
1.68
1.18
1.59
1.51
1.08

Tables 1 and 2 show that the projected benefit at retirement from the
variable defined benefit plan is at all ages less variable than that from
the money purchase plan. The difference in variability is not that great
at age 25, but becomes more significant as the member nears retirement. Thus, the funnel of doubt narrows more quickly in the variable
defined benefit plan. Members of the variable defined benefit plan will
have less need to switch their fund to low risk assets on approaching
retirement, as normally would be recommended in a money purchase
arrangement.
The narrowing funnel of doubt also means that a member of the
variable defined benefit plan will have more advance warning of a substandard benefit at retirement. We can see how this could occur: a
member who had experienced a period of nil accrual or was currently
serving in such a period would have a reduced benefit expectation. The
advantage of such foresight is that it gives the member an incentive to
make additional provision for retirement.

5.5

Effect of a Lower Funding Margin

We have somewhat arbitrarily assumed that our variable defined
benefit plan would operate with a funding margin of 50 percent, so
that only surpluses in excess of this margin would be distributed. In
practice a margin of this size may not be permitted by legislation. We
now examine the consequences of using a lower funding margin to determine whether the variable defined benefit plan can operate as effectively under such a regime.
Using the same stochastic model for equity returns, 1000 simulations are made for the variable defined benefit plan assuming that all
surpluses in excess of a funding ratio of 125 percent are distributed
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immediately. All other initial assumptions are as before. The results of
the simulations are shown in Table 4.
In Table 5 we tabulate the interquartile ratios, comparing the results
with those obtained for the variable defined benefit plan using a 50
percent funding margin. The increase in variability caused by reducing
the funding margin to 25 percent is not particularly large. The possible
effect on the results of using an initial funding ratio of 100 percent,
however, should be borne in mind.
Table 4
Percentiles for a 25 Percent Funding Margin
Percentile
Initial
Age
5th 25th 50th 75th
95th
25
46.6 60.5 73.7 93.7
130.2
45
56.7 67.2 74.3 87.5
116.2
55
66.0 71.8 74.1 78.2
92.5

Table 5
Interquartile Ratio
Funding Margin
Initial
Age
50 Percent 25 Percent
25
1.53
1.55
45
1.30
1.18
1.08
1.09
55

6
6.1

Ruin Scenarios
Effect of Poor Investment Experience

Thus far we have shown that our plan could cope with investment
returns 1 percent lower than assumed by the actuary. Part (c) of Figure
3 shows that the plan ends with a comfortable funding surplus after 45
years, at the price of having to suspend accrual of benefits from 1972
to 1984. (See Part (c) of Figure 2.)
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We now turn our attention to more extreme situations, in which
even the suspension of accrual is not sufficient to restore the plan to
solvency. Our plan cannot, by definition, be insolvent following a windup because the benefits payable in such an event are shares of the remaining fund. It is theoretically possible, however, that the plan could
exhaust its assets while still in operation, resulting in insufficient cash
flow to pay the benefits promised to retiring members. There are two
factors that might lead to such a situation:
• Extremely and persistently poor investment returns;
• Moderately poor investment returns combined with a declining
number of active members.
A declining number of active members would lead to declining contribution income from the employer, making it more difficult to restore
the plan to a satisfactory position by suspending the accrual of benefits.

6.2

Stationary Active Member Population

Assume that, as in previous simulations, our plan has a stationary
population of active members and that Eo is based on a net interest
assumption of 3 percent; FR(O) = 100%; n(x, 0) = x - 25; and a(t) and
b t are determined as in equations (16) and (17).
We simulate the progress of the plan for the following investment
scenarios:
l. jt "" et - 0.04; and

2. jt

=

et - 0.10.

Scenario (1) implies an average return net of wage inflation of 0 percent
per annum, whereas scenario (2) implies an average net return of -6
percent per annum. Figure 5 shows the results of these simulations.
Part (a) of Figure 5 shows that in both scenarios the assets of the
plan reach a low point after the stock market crash of 1974-1975. In
scenario 2 the assets fall close to zero in 1975, but the plan recovers in
the following years.
Part (b) of Figure 5 shows that the benefit outgo falls in both scenarios. In scenario 2 the poor investment experience results in the continuous suspension of accrual from 1951 to 1985; thus, the benefit outgo
falls more steeply compared with scenario l. An important threshold is
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Figure 5
Effect of Low Investment Returns:
Stationary Active Member Population
Part (a): market value of assets
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attained when the benefit outgo falls below 40 units, the annual contribution income from the employer. At this point the plan is assured of
having sufficient cash flow to pay future benefits. Thus, provided that
the plan has survived to this threshold, there is no longer an immediate
risk of ruin. Significantly, in scenario 2 the benefit outgo falls below 40
units shortly before the stock market crash of 1974-1975.
Part (c) of Figure 5 shows that in both scenarios the solvency ratio
falls to a low point after the 1974-1975 crash and recovers strongly
over the following decade. In scenario 2 there is a brief period in the
early 1980s when the solvency ratio explodes: reaching a maximum
value of 910 percent at the start of 1985. This occurs because the
accrued liabilities of the plan have fallen to a low figure as a result of
the suspension of accrual of benefits for over 30 years. The solvency
ratio of 910 percent is accompanied by a funding ratio of only 127
percent, illustrating the suitability of the entry age normal method for
plans with small accrued liabilities.
These simulations show that the risk of ruin from poor investment
experience is not much of a problem, provided that the number of active members (and therefore the contribution income) does not decline.
Even if investment returns average 6 percent per annum below wage inflation (a pessimistic scenario) and returns are as variable as those over
the past 45 years (including the unusually severe crash of 1974-1975)
our plan would have avoided ruin.
Ruin probabilities are estimated from simulations obtained using
the stochastic model for equity returns described above. One hundred
simulations are made for various different combinations of the mean of
the log-normal distribution for rt and the initial solvency ratio. For the
plan to avoid ruin, we require that F (t) > 0 for all t > O. The number
of occasions on which the plan fails to avoid ruin over each run of 100
simulations is shown in Table 6.
Table 6
Ruin Frequency
Stationary Active Member Population
Average Return on'Fund (A VRF)

SR(O)
1.00
0.75
0.50

0%
0
0
1

-1%
0
0
7

-2%
1
2
28

-3%
1
2
41

-4%
1
3
56

-5%
1
14
83

-6%
17
31
89

-7%
42
59
99

-8%
71
73
100
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As before, ruin probabilities are estimated from simulations obtained using the stochastic model for equity returns described earlier,
each run consisting of 100 simulations. The results are displayed in
Table 7.
Table 7
Ruin Frequency
Declining Active Member Population
Average Return on Fund
SR(O)
0% 1% 2% 3% 4%
1.50
5
0
73 34 20
1.00
90 72 45 21
6
0.50
98 89 67 44 30

The frequencies obtained again appear broadly consistent with the
results of the deterministic simulations. Even when the initial solvency
ratio is 100 percent and the average net investment return is 3 percent
per annum (in line with the actuary's assumption), the estimated probability of ruin is as high as 0.21. Furthermore, a high initial solvency
ratio of 150 percent does not seem to offer much additional protection; the estimated probability of ruin is still as high as 0.20 when the
average investment return is only 1 percent below that assumed by the
actuary.

6.4

Avoiding Ruin

When we have a stationary population of active members, investment returns have to be poor for our plan to run out of money. Unless
the average return falls below the actuary's assumption by around 9
percent per annum, the suspension of accrual appears to be a strong
enough remedy to restore the plan to solvency. Once the benefit outgo
of the plan falls below the contribution income, the possibility of ruin
disappears.
The main problem with the above approach is dissatisfaction among
active members if it appears that the accrual of benefits has been suspended for an indefinite period. It is essential that our proposed plan
requires no member contributions, in order to reduce the likelihood
that a large proportion of the active members would leave the plan if
beaefit accrual were suspended.
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Another option would be to seek the consent of the members for
their accrued benefits to be scaled back in proportion to the solvency
deficit and for accrual to continue at a somewhat lower rate than before.
In such a situation there would be a clear conflict of interest between
members with different amounts of past service; those with long past
service would have most to lose from the accrued benefits being uniformly scaled back, whereas younger members potentially would have
most to gain by the restoration of benefit accrual. The actuary would
play an important role here in suggesting a suitable compromise; the
solvency deficit could be eliminated partly by a cut in the accrued benefits and partly by fixing the rate of benefit accrual at a low level for a
temporary period.
When the active member population of the plan is declining, the risk
of ruin is more serious. In this situation the contribution income of the
plan is falling in relation to the accrued liabilities, so the suspension of
accrual is less effective in restoring the plan to solvency.
Allowing the plan to run out of money is unacceptable, as the remaining active members would be left with no benefits at all at the
expense of those who had been lucky enough to retire (or take transfer
values) earlier. The plan would have to be wound-up, or converted to
a pure money purchase arrangement, before the risk of ruin became
too great. Ideally, this would be done when the solvency ratio was still
above 100 percent.

7 Summary and Conclusions
7.1

Summary of Main Findings

The purpose of this paper is to examine the feasibility of running
a defined contribution plan with a defined benefit scale that could be
varied to accommodate unpredictable and volatile investment returns.
The progress of a simple model plan, paying a benefit linked to career average revalued salary, has been simulated. These simulations
include both deterministic projections based on U.K. investment and
earnings data taken from 1950 to 1994 and projections obtained using
a stochastic model for equity returns. It has been shown that:
• In order to maintain a fixed defined benefit scale over the period
the actuary would have had to predict the average investment return net of wage inflation to an unrealistic degree of accuracy;
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• A plan in which the benefit scale is varied when the size of the
fund falls outside a central corridor can accommodate differences
between actual and assumed investment returns and can maintain
reasonable funding and solvency ratios for returns as variable as
those experienced over the period;
• The benefit payout of this variable defined benefit plan is more
stable over time than that of a money purchase plan subject to
the same volatile investment returns;
• The uncertainty in the projected benefit payout of the variable
defined benefit plan is less than in a money purchase plan and
reduces more quickly as a member approaches retirement;
• Provided that the number of acth'e members is not declining, the
risk of ruin due to poor investment experience is small for the
variable defined benefit plan; and
• If the number of active members is declining, the risk of ruin

becomes increasingly significant for the variable defined benefit
plan, and the plan would need to be wound-up or converted to a
money purchase arrangement.

7.2

Comments on Plan Design

Although the proposed integrated plan pays a benefit linked to career average revalued salary, the same results would have been obtained
for a final salary plan because we assume that each member's salary is
fixed in units linked to general wage inflation. In the real world a career average scale would have concrete advantages because the accrued
liabilities would be less volatile when actual salary increases deviated
from wage inflation. It is also arguable that a career average scale is
better for members, as their benefits are affected less by variations in
pay close to retirement.
The proposed plan requires no member contributions, which seems
to be an absolute necessity if the accrual of benefits is to be suspended
(or severely curtailed) when the solvency ratio falls below a critical
value. Mason (1993) outlines a simple method for converting a contributory plan to a noncontributory plan at no cost to the employer.
There are no pensioner liabilities, because we have assumed a lump
sum benefit is provided at retirement. In practice the lump sum would
be used to buy an immediate annuity from an insurance company.
There are two good reasons why the plan should avoid retaining pensioner liabilities, viz.:
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• Retaining such liabilities would reduce the ratio of the contribution income to the accrued liabilities, making it more difficult to
eliminate a solvency deficit by suspending the accrual of benefit
and thus increasing the risk of ruin; and
• Pensioners would seek representation on a trustee board, and
their interests might conflict with those of the active members.
The benefit on withdrawal from service is revalued in line with wage
inflation. This ensures that the expected benefit at retirement is proportional to the length of pensionable service, irrespective of when the
member leaves the plan. Final salary plans give a lower benefit to those
who leave early, because the rate of revaluation of deferred pensions
is normally below wage inflation. A money purchase plan paying the
same rate of contribution for all members favors younger entrants because their funds accumulate over longer periods compared with older
entrants. It is reasonable to assume that a rational group of employees
would prefer the equitable approach meted by a career average plan.

7.3

Rules for Adjusting the Benefits

The simple rules used for adjusting the benefit payout could be refined to permit greater flexibility. For example, we have assumed that
the whole of any surplus in excess of a 50 percent funding margin would
be distributed immediately. Members retiring just before the funding
ratio went above 150 percent might feel aggrieved. The actuary instead
could recommend a sliding scale for surplus distributions. Similarly, if
the solvency position of the plan were threatened, step-by-step reductions in the rate of accrual may be preferable to the complete suspension of accrual. Refinements of this kind could reduce the variability
in the benefit payout of the plan.
Explicit rules should exist for adjusting the benefit scale, rather
than allowing a purely discretionary approach (as in a with-profit fund).
Members are unlikely to enjoy having their benefits being determined
by what they may perceive as the ,,,,him of the plan actuary. If the actuary felt that any change in the rules were required, this could be put to
the trustees.

7.4

Role of the Plan Actuary

There is little doubt that the plan actuary would have a vital role,
possibly a more important role than in a traditional defined benefit
plan. The members would depend on the advice of the actuary to:
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• Agree on a suitable target benefit for their plan;
• Decide on equitable methods for distributing surplus while retaining an adequate margin against possible unfavorable future
experience;
• Decide on equitable methods for keeping the plan solvent should
investment returns be poorer than expected;
• Take appropriate action if the risk of ruin had become unacceptable as a result of a decline in the number of active members.

References
Bodie, N. "Retirement Provision Issues for Employers and Employees."
Journal of Staple Inn Actuarial Society (March 18, 1989).
Carr, D. "Determination of the Contribution Rate to Money Purchase
Arrangements." Journal of Staple Inn Actuarial Society (March IS,
1988).
Davies, B. "Pension Scheme Surpluses." Journal of Staple Inn Actuarial
Society (October 22, 1991).
Government Statistical Service. The Abstract of Statistics for Social Security Benefits and Contributions and the Indices of Retail Prices and
Average Earnings. London: Government Statistical Service, 1993.
Mason, J,J, "Design of Company Pension Arrangements." Journal of Staple Inn Actuarial Society (March 30, 1993).
Pension Law Review Committee. Pension Law Reform. Bristol, United
Kingdom: Department of Social Security, 1993.
Wilkie, A.D. "Some Applications of Stochastic Investment Models." Journal of Staple Inn Actuarial Society, 29 (1986): 25-51.

